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Abstract—In Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communication 
systems, vehicles as well as infrastructure devices can interact 
and exchange data with each other. This capability is used to 
implement intelligent transportation systems applications. Data 
confidentiality and integrity need to be preserved in unverified 
and untrusted environments. In this paper, we propose a 
solution that provides (a) role-based and attribute-based access 
control to encrypted data and (b) encrypted search over 
encrypted data. Vehicle Records contain sensitive information 
about the owners and vehicles in encrypted form with attached 
access control policies and policy enforcement engine. Our 
solution supports decentralized and distributed data exchange, 
which is essential in V2X systems, where a Central Authority is 
not required to enforce access control policies. Furthermore, we 
facilitate querying encrypted Vehicle Records through 
Structured Query Language (SQL) queries. Vehicle Records are 
stored in a database in untrusted V2X cloud environment that 
is prone to provide the attackers with a large attack surface. Big 
datasets, stored in cloud, can be used for data analysis, such as 
traffic pattern analysis. Our solution protects sensitive vehicle 
and owner information from curious or malicious information 
cloud administrators. Support of indexing improves 
performance of queries that are forwarded to relevant 
encrypted Vehicle Records, which are stored in the cloud. We 
measure the performance overhead of our security solution 
based on self-protecting Vehicle Records with encrypted search 
capabilities in V2X communication systems and analyze the 
effect of security over safety. 
Keywords-privacy; access control; database privacy; cloud 
data management; cloud security; encrypted search 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
In V2X communication systems, vehicles and roadside 
objects can communicate and share data with each other. It is 
needed to ensure for the data owner that each V2X 
communication network node can access only those data 
items the node is authorized for. Role-based and attribute-
based access control mechanism, which guarantees that 
unauthorized data accesses are denied, is required. In our 
approach, we use an Active Bundle [1] [2] [4] [6] to store 
sensitive data in encrypted form and to transfer sensitive data 
between V2X network nodes. Active Bundle (AB) is a self-
protecting structure that consists of key-value pairs in 
encrypted form, access control policies and policy 
enforcement engine (Virtual Machine) [1]. It supports role-
based and attribute-based access control in centralized and 
decentralized peer-to-peer networks. Our framework supports 
centralized data exchange, employing cloud for storing 
vehicle and owner data. This can be useful if it is necessary to 
query archived data and apply data analysis to big V2X 
datasets. Cloud platforms are vulnerable to large attack 
surface that could violate the privacy of data stored in cloud 
or shared with web services. It is necessary to protect sensitive 
vehicle and owner data from malicious or curious cloud 
administrators if data is stored in untrusted cloud. In addition 
to access control policies, used in role-based access control, 
our model for data exchange between V2X nodes considers 
client attributes [5], including the following: 
1) Level of cryptographic capabilities of the browser, which 
sends data requests by means of http(s) messages. 
2) Authentication method (password-based vs. hardware- 
based vs. fingerprint). Password-based authentication 
method is considered to be least secure. 
3) Type of the device (Mobile vs. Desktop).  
4) Trust level, which is constantly recomputed, based on the 
following metrics: CPU/Memory usage, number of 
sent/received data requests, number of denied data 
requests, number of communication failures. 
5) Context (e.g., normal vs. emergency).    
 
Our approach does not rely on Trusted Third Party (TTP) 
to issue keys for the recipient services, since keys for data 
request are generated on-the-fly by the Active Bundle kernel 
during data decryption phase, based on the execution flow. 
Our model supports complex access control policies that can 
be written in Java language [1], having an opportunity to 
express a variety of access control policies.  
Untrusted cloud provider may host a database of Vehicle 
Records (VRs), where each VR is represented by an Active 
Bundle [1] [4], which contains vehicle and owner data in 
encrypted form. The database contains extra-attributes used 
for indexing, which are also stored in encrypted form. The 
database engine needs to be able to execute SQL queries, 
operating on encrypted data, in order to retrieve relevant VRs 
for further data processing. This is achieved through the use 
of Homomorphic Encryption (HE), which allows operations 
over encrypted data. Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) 
allows arbitrary operations over encrypted data, but despite 
advances [7] still exhibits prohibitive overhead. Instead, we 
focus on using Partially Homomorphic Encryption (PHE), 
following the approach of CryptDB [3], which allows 
computation over encrypted data with respect to specific 
operations but exhibits practical overhead. When it comes to 
safety features of the V2X systems, heavy security features 
may come at a cost due to communication, computation, and 
storage overhead of the features. Expensive security solutions 
may hinder the safety of the system by prioritizing security 
features over safety.  
This paper has two main contributions: 
1) Privacy-preserving data exchange method for V2X 
communication systems, which provides data 
confidentiality and integrity for data transfers in 
decentralized networks. Our method supports both role-
based and attribute-based access control. It also allows 
detecting and preventing multiple scenarios of data 
leakages made by insiders. 
2) Capability of encrypted search over encrypted Vehicle 
Records, which are stored in untrusted cloud. Our method 
provides confidentiality and integrity of data stored in 
untrusted clouds. Subset of SQL queries over encrypted 
data is supported. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section II 
presents related work. Section III presents the core design of 
our system. Section IV evaluates performance of the system. 
Section V concludes the paper. 
II. RELATED WORK 
In Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS) it is critical to 
ensure the privacy of the vehicles by not identifying their real 
identities. Both European standards (ETSI) and US standards 
(WAVE) have specific requirements to establish and 
maintain vehicles privacy. Based on the ETSI standards, 
anonymity, pseudonymity, unlinkability and unobservability 
are all required to establish privacy [8].  
Ranchal et al [2] proposed a Framework for Enforcing 
Security Policies in Composite Web Services (EPICS), which 
protects data privacy throughout the service interaction 
lifecycle. The framework instantiates and extends the Active 
Bundle concept [4] for the Service Oriented Architecture 
(SOA) style. The solution ensures that the data are distributed 
along with the client policies, that dictate data access, and with 
an execution monitor that controls data disclosure. The 
framework empowers data owners with control of data 
disclosure decisions outside their trust domains and reduces 
the risk of unauthorized access. In this paper, we extended this 
approach with the following: 
(a) Support of encrypted search over encrypted data records. 
(b) Detection and prevention of multiple scenarios of data 
leakages that can be made by authorized insiders to 
unauthorized parties. 
(c) Set of attributes used in our data dissemination model 
includes level of client browser’s cryptographic 
capabilities, authentication method and type of the 
device / network. 
 
Zhang et al [24] proposed an approach to detect malicious 
users and cloud providers, based on their trust levels. Network 
nodes are partitioned into domains. In our approach, client's 
trust level is used by an Active Bundle kernel to approve or 
reject data request issued by the client. Service is classified as 
a malicious one if it is detected that service is involved in 
leaking data to unauthorized entities. 
In 2013 Microsoft came up with a CipherBase [9] product, 
which is a SQL database system for storing and processing 
strongly encrypted (i.e., using FHE) data. Cipherbase is based 
on a combination of customized trusted hardware and 
Microsoft SQL Server. It simulates FHE on top of non-
homomorphic encryption schemes (e.g., AES in CBC-mode) 
by integrating trusted hardware. Application logic is 
decoupled from encryption. Our approach is to use PHE to 
achieve more practical encrypted search, and abandon FHE 
which can lead to slowdowns in the order of 10^9 times [10]. 
CryptDB [3] is a seminal work that demonstrates how PHE 
can be used to enable the execution of secure SQL queries 
over encrypted data with practical performance. Crypsis [11] 
and Cuttlefish [12] show that PHE can be used in cloud 
environments utilizing multiple computing nodes to perform 
data analytics of large datasets in a distributed fashion. Our 
approach uses PHE to provide encrypted search over 
encrypted set of extra-attributes used for indexing the database 
of VRs, that are also stored in encrypted form and provide 
role-based and attribute-based access control. Our framework 
provides confidentiality and integrity of vehicles and owners 
data, stored in VRs. 
III. CORE DESIGN 
A. System Architecture 
        * Figure 1. V2X Communication Network 
 
In our architecture, vehicles and road infrastructure 
objects can exchange data between each other by means of 
VRs. VR contains owner and vehicle data in encrypted form 
and is implemented as an Active Bundle [1] [4], which is 
discussed in Sections I and III B. An example of a VR is 
given in Table 2. Data exchange between vehicles is shown 
as type 3 in Fig. 1. In addition, our solution supports SQL 
queries over encrypted database of extra-attributes used for 
indexing Vehicle Records database, stored in cloud. The idea 
is to improve performance of data requests to VRs by 
filtering relevant VRs in the first phase using an auxiliary 
*Clipart taken from https://i.stack.imgur.com/EM34o.png; 
http://www.clker.com/cliparts/a/0/d/e/11971194531912449946Chrisdesign_Beetle_
(car).svg.hi.png; http://www.clker.com/cliparts/R/7/e/b/5/X/red-car-hi.png; 
https://cdn1.iconfinder.com/data/icons/vehicles-roads-road-symbols/32/street-
medium-512.png; http://www.clker.com/cliparts/s/E/z/g/z/V/cloud-hi.png; 
http://carpng.com/wp-content/uploads/thumb/police-car-icon-5642-0.png 
indexing database, which contains extra-attributes, and then 
querying only relevant VRs. As extra-attributes, we use 
TABLE 1. ENCRYPTED INDEXING DATABASE INDEXDB 
vehicle ID, speed and model that are sent in encrypted form 
as insert SQL query to encrypted database, stored on a cloud 
provider, every 5 seconds. RSA encryption scheme is used for 
that. Vehicle has keys needed to encrypt ID, speed and model. 
On a cloud instance, each received record is timestamped. 
Fragment of indexing database, IndexDB table, is given in 
table 1. ID is a primary key and it maps every record to VR, 
that is also stored on the same cloud. VR is created once when 
vehicle enters the proximity area of a base station. Base station 
forwards data from vehicles to the cloud provider and, thus, it 
is not expected from it to have any computational power or 
storage capacity. As a use case scenario, law enforcement 
vehicle might need to get a personal data of drivers who 
exceeded speed limits on the highway. Then, in the first phase, 
SQL query is sent to encrypted indexing database: 
 
select ID from IndexDB      
where speed > speed_limit; 
In the second phase, http GET request for license plate number 
and drivers home address will be sent to relevant VRs, i.e. to 
VR with IDs returned by SQL query in the first phase. 
** Figure 2. System Architecture 
 
As a second use case scenario, the Intelligent Transport 
System might need to figure out the traffic pattern on a 
highway in a particular time interval, e.g. during the rush 
hour. In the first phase, SQL query is sent to encrypted 
indexing database, IndexDB, to get IDs of all the vehicles 
which are driving with the speed between 55 and 65 mph. It 
indicates no traffic jam and normal traffic conditions: 
select ID from IndexDB 
where speed between 55 and 65; 
In the second phase, http GET request for license plate number 
and home address will be sent to relevant VRs, i.e. to VRs 
with IDs returned by SQL query in the first phase. It can be 
done in order to figure out vehicles from what state or region 
are the majority on the highway during the rush hour. 
 
 
B. Vehicle Record 
 Our solution relies on Active Bundle (AB) for secure data 
exchange between V2X nodes. Each VR is represented as an 
extended AB, extended with data leakage detection 
capabilities and an extended attribute-based access control. 
Figure 3. Vehicle Record 
AB is a self-protecting structure that incorporates data in 
encrypted form, access control policies and policy 
enforcement engine (Virtual Machine). Data is stored in AB 
as a non-relational database in the form of key-value pairs 
with encrypted values. Here is the example of key-value 
pair:    {ab.vehicleLicensePlate : Enc(123ABC) } 
 
License Plate value is 123ABC and it is stored in encrypted 
form. Each data item is encrypted with a separate AES 
symmetric key, which is generated on-the-fly based on the 
execution flow. VR data items are shown in table 2.  
TABLE 2. VEHICLE RECORD DATA ITEMS 
 Firstly, when a service, representing a vehicle, requests 
data from VR, hosted by another vehicle (see type 3 
communication between vehicles on Fig. 1), the identity of 
the requesting service is verified. In the authentication 
phase, data requesting service presents its X.509 certificate 
signed by a trusted Certificate Authority (CA) to the VR [1]. 
If authentication succeeds, service attributes are evaluated and 
enforced by the policy enforcement engine, which is part of 
VR. If trust level of service is sufficient then process of 
evaluating applicable access control policies and context (e.g. 
traffic accident, emergency vs. normal) starts. It determines 
what data can be be disclosed to the requesting service. Based 
on that evaluation, symmetric decryption keys are derived to 
decrypt accessible data items. Details of communication 
procedure between web service and AB are covered in [2], [4]. 
Similar VR communication workflow takes place when data 
request is sent to the VR hosted by the cloud provider, e.g. in 
type 4 communication on Fig.1. For instance, type 4 might be 
used when law enforcement entity queries database of VRs in 
order to identify vehicles which exceeded the speed limit. 
After authentication phase, attributes of the client are 
evaluated. Client attributes include cryptographic capabilities   
ID Speed Model Timestamp 
Enc(001) Enc(65) Enc(Toyota) 02/18/2018 15:28 
Enc(002) Enc(66) Enc(Ford) 02/18/2018 15:29 
Enc(003) Enc(67) Enc(Mercedes) 02/18/2018 15:31 
Enc(004) Enc(68) Enc(Mitsubishi) 02/18/2018 15:44 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
Enc(1000) Enc(84) Enc(Chevrolet) 02/18/2018 23:59 
VR 
ID Owner’s Info 
 Name 
 Address 
 Phone 
 Driver’s 
license 
number 
Vehicle’s Info 
 VIN 
 License plate 
 Health Check 
 Engine temperature 
 Fluids Level 
 Tires pressure 
Road Events 
 Traffic jam 
 Accident 
 Road work 
 Obstacle 
**Clipart taken from http://www.iconsplace.com/download/black-car-256.png; 
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/4/49/Applications-
database.svg/2000px-Applications-database.svg.png; 
https://userscontent2.emaze.com/images/61d62748-ced8-4896-95ef-
4c6742928511/68498c6a03c04904903928f0d81aa783.png 
 
of a browser [13] [14], if data request is sent from the web 
browser, and authentication method (password-based, 
fingerprint, hardware-based). This procedure is covered in 
details in [5]. The rest of the VR communication workflow 
is the same as described above for communication of type 3. 
Demo video of the prototype, illustrating this attribute-based 
access control concept, is available [15]. 
VR is tamper-resistant and provides integrity of the 
stored data. It protects data communications between 
services in V2X communication systems from man-in-the-
middle and masquerade attacks, as well as from message 
tampering and fabrication. VR is written in Java and 
implemented as a Java Executable Archive (JAR). Access 
control policies are implemented using JavaScript Object 
Notation (JSON) [16].  Extensible Access Control Markup 
Language (XACML) [17] policy language is also supported 
for specifying access control policies. WSO2 Balana [18] is 
used for policy evaluation. Table 3 shows the example of 
access control policies for VR in V2X network.  
TABLE 3. VEHICLE RECORD ACCESS CONTROL POLICIES 
V2X network communication objects are represented as web 
services, e.g. Law Enforcement, Insurance, Car Repair, 
Driver. Client can be a vehicle or the computer representing 
Intelligent Transportat System or Law Enforcement. Since 
Raspberry Pi hardware has credit-card size and moderate 
power consumption, we assume it can represent vehicle’s 
communication hardware. 
Assumptions: 
1) Hardware platform that runs VR is trusted. OS kernel is 
trusted, as well. 
2) For communication between all the web services https 
protocol is used.  
C. Encrypted Search 
To allow querying vehicle and owner data without 
leaking sensitive information, we use PHE schemes to 
encrypt data items. This allows us to execute queries over 
encrypted data according to the homomorphic operations 
that these PHE schemes provide. More precisely, if 𝐸(𝑥) 
and 𝐷(𝑥) denote the encryption and decryption functions for 
input data 𝑥 respectively, an encryption scheme is said to be 
partially homomorphic with respect to operation ⊙  iff 
∃⨂ 𝑠. 𝑡. 𝐷(𝐸(𝑥1) ⨂ 𝐸(𝑥2))  =  𝑥1 ⊙ 𝑥2 . Table 4 shows 
the encryption schemes used in our approach along with the 
supported operations of each scheme and an example query. 
In Google Cloud we deployed a database of VRs, that store 
ID, road events, vehicle and owner data in encrypted form. As 
discussed in section III B, each VR is stored as an extended 
AB. On the same cloud provider we also deployed indexing 
TABLE 4. OPERATIONS SUPPORTED BY DIFFERENT ENCRYPTION SCHEMES 
database that contains extra-attributes used for VR indexing. 
In our case, extra-attributes are car ID, model and speed. 
Extra-attributes are stored in encrypted form as well, but as a 
relational database, not as key-value pairs, in contrast with 
VR. Each tuple in indexing database table is timestamped by 
cloud provider once data packet with ID, speed and model is 
received from the vehicle every 5 seconds (see Fig. 1). As 
illustrated on Fig. 4, ID maps each extra-attribute tuple in 
indexing database to its corresponding VR, i.e. detailed record 
of a given vehicle, that contains vehicle owner’s personal 
information, vehicle registration information, VIN Number, 
results of the latest vehicle’s health check, etc - see Table 2. 
 
Figure 4. Mapping between Vehicle Record and indexing attribute 
 
As it can be seen from Fig. 5, our encrypted search is 
implemented by leveraging the design of CryptDB [3] open-
source database engine. When users submit SQL queries, a 
proxy at the client side intercepts the query and transforms it 
into a semantically equivalent query that operates over 
encrypted data. The transformed query is then deployed to 
the encrypted database. The functions shown in Table 4 are 
implemented as User-defined functions in the SQL server. 
CryptDB stores encrypted data and it is able to execute set 
of SQL queries, operating on encrypted data. It never 
releases decryption key to a database. Thus, when 
compromised, only ciphertext is revealed and data leakage is 
limited to data for users who are currently logged in. 
CryptDB provides confidentiality of Vehicle Records 
database, hosted by cloud provider. The crucial difference in 
our design compared to CryptDB is the two-layer approach 
in retrieving encrypted information. The first layer uses a set 
of extra-attributes (as described in the example in Section III 
A) which are appropriately encrypted using PHE to allow 
filtering and retrieving the relevant VRs. The second layer 
Allow 
Resource 
Driver’s License 
Number 
VIN 
Owner’s 
Address 
Traffic Events 
Subject’s 
Role 
Law 
Enforcement 
Law 
Enforcement,
Car Repair 
Law 
Enforcement
, Car Repair, 
Insurance 
Law 
Enforcement, 
Insurance, 
Other Drivers 
Action Read Read Read Read 
Encryption 
Scheme 
Homomorphic 
Property 
Supported 
Operations 
Example 
Paillier AHE +, SUM Count sum of tolls paid 
by vehicles on a highway 
ElGamal MHE * 
Count covered distance 
which is multiplication: 
time * average speed 
Boldyreva et al. OPE 
<, >, MIN, 
MAX 
select ID, Speed, Model 
from IndexDB where 
Speed between 71 and 80 
SWP SRCH 
Tokenized 
search 
select Model from 
IndexDB where issue 
LIKE %battery% 
AES DET Exact search 
select ID from IndexDB 
where Model = ‘Ford’ 
comes from the data protection mechanism provided by the 
VRs themselves. 
Let us consider the use case when it is required for law 
enforcement entity to figure out personal data of drivers who 
exceeded speed limit of 65 mph on a highway and went 
above 76 mph. Then the required query will look like that: 
SELECT ID FROM IndexDB WHERE SPEED > 76; 
Converted query: 
SELECT c1 FROM Alias1 
WHERE ESRCH (Enc(Speed), Enc(76)); 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Encrypted Database Architecture 
 
Result is received in the plaintext form at the client’s side, but 
it is still encrypted on Cloud Providers side and, thus, is 
protected against curious or malicious cloud administrators. 
 
D. Safety vs. Security 
Safety is one of the vital aspects of V2X systems to 
maintain integrity and reliability of the system. However, 
security features add additional computation, 
communication, as well as storage costs to the system. The 
wireless communication devices in V2X systems are usually 
built with non-tamper-resistant hardware with basic 
configuration and often deployed in unpredictable and harsh 
environments [19]. Due to cost constraints, V2V systems are 
equipped with inexpensive processors that can process only 
limited information [20]. Information arrival rate (packet 
rate) in many traffic scenarios is very fast and, as a result, the 
verification of that information is slowed down. Packets that 
are not verified in a particular time epoch will be dropped 
from the security queue [21]. Security of the system will be 
compromised without the verification of packets in time, 
which causes packet loss. As Fig. 6 shows, V2X systems need 
to have a balanced approach among safety, security, and 
Quality of Services (QoS). But packet loss reduces the QoS 
of V2V significantly. 
               
Figure 6. Safety and Quality of Service with Security Overhead 
 
Several approaches have been proposed in literature to 
deal with this issue. Priority-based schemes are presented in 
[20]. [22] proposes processing of critical packets first and add 
others to the verification queue. Our research involves 
assigning a trust factor to the information provider. 
IV. EVALUATION 
We evaluated performance overhead for different 
encryption schemes on V2X devices in section A. Section B 
has performance evaluation for inter-vehicle communication. 
Round-trip time (RTT) is measured between the moments 
when vehicle service issues data request to another vehicle 
and retrieved data are received by the requesting service. It 
includes authentication, authorization, data leakage check, 
key derivation, and data disclosure phases. In section C we 
evaluated performance of queries sent to VRs hosted by 
Google cloud instance. ApacheBench, ver.2.3, utility is used 
on client side for RTT measurements in sections B and C. 
Detailed configuration setup for our framework is available in 
the tutorial [23]. Section D has the evaluation of execution 
times for SQL queries, sent to encrypted database. 
A. Encryption Schemes Overhead of V2V Devices 
To keep generated data secure, V2X devices need to 
encrypt the data before sending them to the network. In this 
evaluation, we consider the encryption and decryption 
overhead of various encryption schemes on a device with 
relatively small computation capabilities, to evaluate the 
feasibility of encryption from the point of view of V2X 
devices. We compare the time needed for a) encryption and b) 
decryption between a server and a V2X device and show the 
results (average of 100 runs) in Figures 7 and 8. Specifically, 
for the V2X device we use Raspberry Pi Zero W, which is a 
widely popular device that has capabilities similar to devices 
found in vehicle tracking, highway cameras and various other 
IoT devices. Raspberry Pi Zero W comes with a 1GHz 32-bit 
single-core CPU and 512MB RAM. For the server we use a 
MacBook Pro with a 2.2 GHz Intel Core i7 CPU and 16GB 
RAM, running macOS Sierra 10.12.6. Encryption schemes 
were implemented in C using the SSL library (OpenSSL 
version 1.0.1t) and its BIGNUM primitive for big number 
computations.  
   
Figure 7. Encryption time comparison between a server and Raspberry 
Pi with crypto systems implemented using OpenSSL (logarithmic y-scale) 
 
We observe that the average ratio of execution time across 
all encryption schemes on Raspberry Pi over the execution 
time on the server for encryption and decryption is 18.95 and 
17.12 respectively. This overhead is acceptable, especially 
when the V2X device is not expected to make too frequent 
measurements. Furthermore, this overhead can be drastically 
reduced using pre-computation, as described in [22]. 
 
Figure 8. Decryption time comparison between a server and Raspberry 
Pi with crypto systems implemented using OpenSSL (logarithmic y-scale) 
 
B. Latency Evaluation for communication between two 
vehicles 
In this experiment, we simulate inter-vehicle 
communication by having two Raspberry Pi’s communicating 
with each other. One vehicle (Raspberry Pi) hosts a VR in the 
form of AB and listens to the opened port 5555. Second 
vehicle (also represented by Raspberry Pi) sends data request 
to that VR over TCP/IP network, port 5555. Vehicle ID field 
is requested. We measure data request latency that also 
includes network delays. Two vehicles are represented by two 
Raspberry PIs with separate IP addresses. 
 
Vehicles 1, 2 (Raspberry PI 3 Model B) 
Hardware: ARMv7 Processor rev 4 @1.2GHz, RAM 1GB    
OS: Raspbian GNU/Linux 9.1 (stretch) 
 
Results on Fig. 9 represent inter-vehicle communication 
round trip time when first initial data request is sent to another 
vehicle. We consider it as a special case since the very first 
request to VR takes significantly longer to be executed due to 
initial authentication phase and initial evaluation of 
attributes. Using a VR with embedded attribute-based access 
control and tamper resistance, adds 6.4% performance 
overhead. 
In the next experiment, we run 50 data  requests  in  a row. 
As it can be seen  from  Fig.  10,  mean  RTT  has  been 
decreased 4.64 times for basic AB and 4.37 times for VR. 
 
Figure 9. Inter-vehicle Communication Round Trip Time (initial request) 
 
Using a VR with embedded attribute-based access control 
and tamper resistance, adds 13% performance overhead. 
          
Figure 10. Inter-vehicle Communication Round Trip Time 
 
C. Latency Evaluation for data requests to Vehicle Records 
In this experiment we aim to measure latency of data 
request sent to VR, that is hosted by Google Cloud instance 
with the following  characteristics:         
Hardware: Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU 2.30GHz 
OS: Linux Debian 4.9.65-3+deb9u2 (2018-01-04) x86 64, 
kernel 4.9.0-5-amd64, 64 bit 
Request for Vehicle ID is sent to VR, represented as an 
extended AB, and to basic AB, that, in contrast with VR, does 
not support neither extended attribute-based access control 
nor tamper-resistance nor data leakage detection. Both VR 
and basic AB run on a Google cloud instance that hosts a 
database of VRs and Indexing Database (see Fig. 4). Basic 
AB, as well as VR, has 4 access control policies. Examples 
of access control policies are given in table 3. Data request 
is issued from the service to basic AB and VR, running on a 
remote cloud service, which has external IP address. Thus, 
we measure RTT for a cloud data request and consider 
network delays between vehicle and cloud provider. 
Results on Fig. 11 represent latency when first initial data 
request is sent to cloud. We  consider it as a special  case since 
the very first request to AB and to VR takes significantly 
longer to be executed due to initial authentication phase and 
initial evaluation of attributes. Using a VR with embedded 
attribute-based access control and tamper resistance, adds 
5.1% performance overhead. In the next experiment, we run 
50 data requests in a row. As it can be seen from Fig.12, mean 
 
Figure 11. Performance overhead of Vehicle Record, hosted by Google 
Cloud (initial request) 
 
value of RTT has been decreased 2.57 times for basic AB and 
2.62 times for VR. Tamper-resistance support adds overhead 
since the hash value of an AB and  its  modules  (code,  access 
control policies, certificates) is verified by AB kernel when 
     
Figure 12. Performance overhead of Vehicle Record, hosted by Google 
Cloud 
data request arrives. Detection of client’s browser 
cryptographic capabilities and authentication method impose 
extra overhead since before responding to the client’s request, 
AB needs to know the level of the browsers cryptographic 
capabilities and check whether it is sufficient. Authentication 
method is also processed by AB kernel. Using a VR with 
embedded attribute-based access control and tamper 
resistance, adds 3.1% performance overhead. 
D. Encrypted Search Evaluation 
In this experiment, we deploy two databases, a regular one 
where no encryption is used and therefore all sensitive 
information is leaked, and one that employs homomorphic 
encryption to keep data confidential while allowing search 
over encrypted data. Data request processing has two phases: 
(1) filter relevant VRs from the regular/encrypted database 
and (2) extract accessible requested data items from relevant 
VRs, stored as ABs. 
We have performed the evaluation on a Linux Ubuntu 
12.04.5 LTS machine (kernel 3.13.0-32-generic, 64-bit) with 
a 1.9GHz CPU and 1GB RAM using MySQL as our database 
engine. The database contains a single table named IndexDB 
and it was populated with 1000 tuples. Fragment of IndexDB 
table is given in table 1. In this experiment, the client issues 
the following five SQL queries: 
 
Equality query (Q1): 
SELECT ID FROM IndexDB WHERE model = ‘Ford’  
 
Inequality query (Q2): 
SELECT ID,speed,model FROM IndexDB WHERE speed > 80 
 
Inequality query, shortened (Q3): 
SELECT ID FROM IndexDB WHERE speed > 80 
 
Range query (Q4): 
SELECT ID, speed, model FROM IndexDB WHERE speed 
BETWEEN 71 AND 80 
 
Range query, shortened (Q5): 
SELECT ID FROM IndexDB WHERE speed BETWEEN 71 AND 80 
 
Q1 retrieves all records that match an exact value for the 
model of the vehicle and therefore requires an exact match. 
Q2 retrieves all records with speed greater than a certain 
value and therefore it requires order comparisons.  Q3 is the 
same as Q2 except that the query returns only the ID of the 
records. In the case the query is executed in an encrypted 
database, this query demonstrates the time spent in 
decrypting the results, in comparison to Q2. Similarly, Q4 
and Q5 filter records whose speeds are within a certain range 
of values. We measure query execution time for plaintext 
database and compare it with the query execution time when 
data and search query are encrypted. We encrypted the model 
column using a deterministic encryption scheme and the 
speed column using an order-preserving encryption scheme. 
 
 
Figure 13. Performance overhead imposed by encrypted search over 
encrypted data 
 
The results of this experiment are shown in table 5.  
TABLE 5. SQL QUERY EXECUTION TIME FOR REGULAR/ENCRYPTED 
INDEXING DATABASE 
All reported times are the average of 50 executions. Query 
execution time grows 26 times for Q1 over encrypted 
database. This time includes the decryption time for the 
results. For Q2, the overhead is 112 times when all three 
columns need to be decrypted or 54 times when only the ID 
needs to be decrypted as in Q3. For Q4, the overhead 157 
times and for Q5 the overhead is 48 times. In the next 
evaluation, we measure overall data request latency, which 
consists of two parts: (a) Query execution time for SQL query 
that is sent to indexing database in order to filter relevant VRs 
(b) Time to process data request by VR kernel. In our 
experiment there is one relevant VR filtered in phase (a) and 
then data request for vehicle owners home address is sent to 
relevant VR in phase (b). Results are shown on Fig. 13. 
V. CONCLUSION 
We presented a privacy-preserving data exchange model 
for V2X systems that provides data confidentiality and 
integrity. It supports both role-based and attribute-based 
access control, as well as detection of data leakages, made by 
authorized insiders to unauthorized entities. Evaluated 
attributes include trust level, level of client browser’s 
cryptographic capabilities, client’s authentication method and 
context. Our approach can be used for secure inter-vehicle 
data communications in untrusted environments. Operation in 
decentralized peer-to-peer networks is supported. We also 
 Query Execution Time (ms) 
Regular Database Encrypted Database 
Q1 1.91 50 
Q2 3.22 360 
Q3 2.76 150 
Q4 4.90 770 
Q5 4.58 220 
support complex access control policies and on-the-fly data 
updates that can be made by authorized parties. Measured 
data transaction latency between two vehicles is 152 msec. 
Using a VR with embedded extended attribute-based access 
control and tamper resistance, adds at most 13% performance 
overhead, compared to the baseline, when tamper-resistance 
is not provided, and cryptographic capabilities of a client’s 
browser are not evaluated. Our approach shows that security 
features for inter-vehicle data communication can be 
implemented at a small cost without overshadowing the 
safety features. 
Our secure data access methodology can be also used to 
protect data, hosted by untrusted cloud provider, from curious 
or malicious cloud administrators. Sensitive vehicle data and 
owner data are stored in cloud in encrypted form and a large 
subset of SQL queries over encrypted VRs is supported. These 
SQL queries are used to filter out relevant VRs in the first 
phase of data request.  Extra-attributes such as ID, speed and 
model are used for VR indexing. In the second phase, the data 
request is sent to the relevant VRs, stored in encrypted form. 
Measured execution time for phase 1 SQL equality query to 
encrypted indexing database of extra-attributes is 50 msec. 
Query execution time grows 26 times for equality query to 
encrypted database compared to querying plaintext database. 
Overall round-trip time for data request, sent to VR, is 121 
msec. Extra attributes used for indexing are encrypted using a 
deterministic encryption scheme and an order-preserving 
encryption scheme. Our model supports range queries, the 
overhead for querying encrypted database is 157 times greater 
compared to querying plaintext database with range queries. 
FUTURE WORK 
We plan to work on a mechanism to provide inter-vehicle 
data communication in the presence of network failures. 
Impact of small “window of opportunity" for data 
transmission on transmission quality will be studied.  
In addition, several experimental environments will be 
used to evaluate performance overhead in heterogeneous 
settings, with multiple vehicles and with varying amount of 
data exchanged between vehicles.  
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